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Abstract—Enterprise computing is moving towards more open,
collaborative systems. Joining a business network must be made
efficient, despite the technical and semantic interoperability
challenges involved in connecting different information and
communication systems. Trust or lack thereof forms a pragmatic
challenge: partners must continuously evaluate whether they
trust each other enough to collaborate in the face of risk.
Supporting technology is needed for making trust-based decisions
on routine business transactions and observing the business peers
for malicious or incorrect behaviour on interactions. We present
a trust model for automating routine decision-making which
considers both risk probabilities and tolerance valuations in the
enterprise, and is dynamically updated based on new experience
gathered both locally and from third parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprise computing is currently moving towards more
open, collaborative systems, business networks [1]–[6].
Collaboration allows organizations to focus their resources
on a few key fields of expertise, while continuing to pro-
vide broader services for customers. It also enables small
and medium enterprises to compete in fields dominated by
large corporations by joining together to gain more influence
than they would have separately. The enterprises maintain
their independence during the collaboration, and make local
decisions based on the enterprise policy.
The value added by a collaborative business network must
be balanced with its costs. It therefore becomes essential to
make joining a business network efficient. Connecting to new
information systems should be straightforward, and locating
new partners should be made automatic when the business
need is defined. Trust management between partners should
be supported by automated trust decisions on routine business
transactions, and observing business peers for malicious or in-
correct behaviour on interactions. Contract negotiations should
be based on machine-interpretable templates and routine ne-
gotiations largely automated.
There are technical and social challenges in the way of this
development. Information systems that should be connected
are incompatible both technically and semantically, and system
integration is expensive and time consuming. Trust between
new partners cannot be formed the same way as before when
the entire process of setting up a collaboration is accelerated
from several months, even years of negotiations to a few
days or less. The actors are autonomous, and do not all use
compatible information systems. The environment is also fully
distributed; there are no trusted third parties that would give
consultation on whom to trust, or solve all contractual disputes.
A new kind of middleware is needed to help collaboration
management. The tasks of the middleware include partner
selection and negotiation, interoperability tests for technical
and business aspects of services, collaboration lifecycle man-
agement with partner changes, and breach management [7],
[8]. In developing this kind of middleware, a new approach
to managing trust relationships between partners is required.
The trust management system has two major tasks [9]: first,
it should act as a guard for the service application, applying
trust decisions to protect the enterprise from taking too high
risks. Second, it should upkeep reputation information on other
peers, to allow the system to adjust to how the peers have
behaved in the past. Trust is required to balance risks, as an
effective collaboration always contains an element of depen-
dence and vulnerability. This paper discusses calculative trust
that is used for making dynamic, situational trust decisions that
balance estimated risks and the available incentives to trust.
If the risk is found intolerable, either the incentives must be
increased or the risks limited.
The paper presents our trust management system for
inter-enterprise collaboration, TuBE (Trust Based on Evi-
dence) [10]. The focus of the paper is in building the risk
estimation for the trust decision. Section 2 presents the prob-
lem environment and outlines our solution. Section 3 presents
the trust decision system. Section 4 presents related work.
II. TRUST DECISIONS ON INTER-ENTERPRISE
COLLABORATION
Inter-enterprise collaboration builds larger or more complex
services from pieces provided by autonomous organizations.
Collaboration provides strategical benefits for agile enter-
prises, while it also poses new challenges for automating
inter-enterprise business process management and supporting
platforms. Collaborative business networks connect the smaller
services together based on a business network model, which
defines the roles and interactions between the smaller services.
They are established dynamically in response to a certain
business scenario or opportunity. The participants dynamically
negotiate an electronic contract to govern the collaboration.
Together the participants provide a composite service, where
each peer’s business service fulfils a given role in the network.
The Pilarcos approach to inter-enterprise collaboration is
federated: all participants retain their autonomy within the
loosely-coupled business network, and make their own deci-
sions on whether to join or continue in it. Partners are located
in the open service market comprised of service providers’
offers. Nothing can be said about the trustworthiness of a
service provider based on their offers. For the offers to form a
breeding environment, identity management is required: to be
able to enter into binding contracts, enterprises must be able to
identify each other. The details of the required identification
process are determined by legislation, and will typically re-
quire an out-of-band registration with local authorities to form
a legal entity. Self-generated identities natural to many peer-to-
peer networks are too ambiguous for enterprise collaboration.
For collaboration management, the Pilarcos middleware pro-
vides several pervasive services. Tools and repositories support
developing and publishing new business network models, and
defining business services that match the needs of the roles
defined in the models [11]. Service offer repositories allow
enterprises to offer their service to the open market in a
way that enables automated matching and interoperability
testing [7]. Service matching and interoperability testing is
done by a populator service based on information in the service
offers [12]. The populator produces match proposals, and can
be provided as a service by a third party, as it only relies on
public information. Multilateral negotiations determine which
proposal is accepted and whether some parameters of the
service need to be further adjusted [8].
The TuBE trust management system forms a part of this
middleware. It determines whether an acceptable level of
mutual trust is present between the partners to support the
collaboration, and upkeeps information needed for the analy-
sis [10].
In TuBE and Pilarcos, trust is defined as the extent to which
one party is willing to participate in a given action with a
given partner in a given situation, considering the risks and
incentives involved. A trust decision evaluates whether the
willingness is sufficient; trust decisions are made on whether
to join an inter-enterprise collaboration to begin with, and
repeated during it whenever risk-relevant commitments are
made. The TuBE system automates routine trust decisions,
comparing the estimated risk and the tolerance for it.
Trust decisions are subjective evaluations made by the
trustor, i.e. trusting party, targeting a given trustee and a
given action. The trustee is a potential or existing partner
enterprise or its representative. The action is represented as a
group of messages exchanged in the context of a commitment
of resources on the trustor’s part: for example, reserving
resources to complete a task or to deliver a set of goods.
Trust decisions are made to protect guarded assets from
possible negative effects caused by defecting partners, disad-
vantageous contract clauses or other threatening elements. The
guarded assets are resources that become vulnerable due to
the uncertainty inherent in relying on a business partner. The
potential for negative effect, the risks, can in some cases be
mitigated through precautions, but the remaining uncertainty
must simply be tolerated in order to collaborate.
We have chosen not to merge all assets into a single
resource, such as money, for the purpose of increased clarity:
it is difficult to convert effects such as reputation loss or gain,
human injury or a security breach to monetary terms, yet they
are clearly important outcomes to consider in a trust decision.
We define a set of four standard assets shared between
organizations: monetary, reputation, control and fulfilment.
The monetary asset represents money and other artifacts
in the enterprise that have a well-defined monetary value.
The reputation asset represents the trustor’s good reputation.
The control asset is a joint representation for the trustor’s
security, privacy and general desired levels of self-protection.
The fulfilment asset represents the fulfilment of the trustor’s
expectations of the trustee’s participation in the action, such as
the quality of the service the trustee provides or its efficiency
in fulfilling its end of the agreement.
A trust decision is based on a comparison of the uncon-
trollable risks that allowing the action would cause, and the
willingness to accept them—risk tolerance. Both are built
by evaluating a lower-level factor, reputation and importance,
respectively. The risk evaluation is expressed as probabilities
of different outcomes, estimating how the partner will behave
in the future. This estimate is based on earlier experience
on the outcomes of earlier collaboration with the trustee.
First-hand experiences and experiences shared by third parties
form the trustee’s reputation, which is the trustor’s subjective
perception of how trustworthy the trustee is, based on currently
available information. Risk tolerance builds on the business
importance of allowing the action: different kinds of benefits
may be realized by a positive decision alone, such as building a
partnership, helping the inter-enterprise collaboration towards
realizing its goals, and not triggering compensation clauses in
the contract.
The four factors of risk, risk tolerance, reputation and
importance represent the valuations, expectations and policies
across the enterprise and are not modified unless those change.
However, the business world fits poorly into rigid frame-
works: the risk evaluation of a particular partner should reflect
whether they are forced to have an insurance which makes
a considerable monetary loss impossible; another partner is
a valued contact, and therefore is particularly important to
collaborate with even in the face of some additional risk. A
third partner’s reputation may suddenly plummet due to what
is suspected to be a misinterpretation.
Both the environment and the internal policies of an enter-
prise are in constant fluctuation. A trust management system
for inter-enterprise collaborations must be prepared to handle
frequent, often temporary adjustments to what is otherwise a
clear set of policies and valuations. In order to retain clarity in
modelling while catering for the messy reality, we have opted
to add a fifth element to trust decisions: context filters.
Context filters are not a factor by themselves. Instead, they
adjust the other four factors to temporary changes and special
cases. When the constraints for triggering a context filter are
met, a modification rule changes the values of the factor before
passing it onwards in the decision-making.
III. MAKING MULTI-DIMENSIONAL TRUST DECISIONS
When a decision is taken to enter a collaboration or take part
in an interaction, it is based on a set of measurable aspects that
represent groups of assets that the enterprise wishes to protect.
Trust decisions are formed from two tracks: on one track,
calculating a risk estimate of the situation, and on the other,
building a measure for risk tolerance. The risk estimate is built
on a view of the reputation of the trustee, and tolerance builds
on the importance of allowing the guarded action. Reputation
represents earlier real-world experiences, and importance the
business value of allowing the action; both are expressed
through the effects on assets. We will first describe the assets,
then present the risk and reputation and the risk tolerance and
importance factor pairs. Lastly, we outline how the decision-
making process is carried out in the middleware.
A. Assets guarded by trust decisions
A is the set of guarded assets, represented by integers
0..|A| − 1. Assuming that the standard assets of monetary,
reputation, control and fulfilment are used, |A| = 4.
The monetary asset forms the basis of decision-making in
many situations, and it is also the simplest to measure. Even
so, the monetary value of an item or a concrete service is not
always straightforward to determine. The trustor can form a
value for a target by deciding how much it would be ready to
pay for it. For trust decisions, this measure is more valuable
than the actual current market value of such a target, and
simpler to determine. If, for example, the trustor is unaware or
uninterested in a particular feature of a device it wishes to buy,
it is irrelevant to the decision whether the device carries such
a feature or not, or whether the feature works, even though
the selling price of the device might depend greatly on it.
The reputation asset encompasses both the enterprise’s
reputation rating in any reputation systems, as well as the more
abstract notion of its public relations, appearance in the media,
and the attitudes of its partners and customers towards it. Since
reputation is a broad phenomenon, a change for the reputation
asset can never be measured as accurately as a monetary loss
or gain, but it allows the enterprise to represent the risk of
losing partners through a traditional drop in perceptions, even
if for some reason the actual calculated reputation does not
change. As partners are not solely dependent on information
shared in a reputation network, other forms of reputation
must be considered as well: for a well-informed decision,
the enterprise should generate estimations of lost reputation
for particular action outcomes, instead of simply monitoring
a reputation network for changes which may not be directly
connected to particular actions to begin with.
The control asset represents the general need for an en-
terprise to protect itself from outside influences: to maintain
control over its security, privacy and other aspects of its
autonomy. The security of an enterprise involves the physical
safety of its people, equipment and goods, and less tangible
aspects such as the continuity, availability and reliability of its
services and the protection of its information and IT systems.
The privacy of an enterprise encompasses its ability to control
information concerning it, beyond confidentiality alone: even
if information becomes unconfidential when it is given to a
partner, the partner can violate the enterprise’s privacy by
passing the information on without permission, or by releasing
false information of its own. A reputation system is a privacy
tradeoff in itself, and it can cause further privacy threats if
a participant releases unfair or false experience information
about its partners. Finally, the enterprise may feel its autonomy
is threatened by some forms of collaboration, for example if
an offered contract has severe enough compensation clauses
to force local decisions.
The fulfilment asset is the one most tightly connected with
a trustee. It encompasses whether the trustee does its part of
what was agreed, leaves something relevant undone or does
something it was not strictly expected to. Where the base for
the monetary asset is the wealth of the organization, the base
for fulfilment is the general trend of respected agreements,
which reflects on the success of the organization. The asset has
high value in evaluating the predictability of the trustee over a
range of highly different actions. Like more traditional assets,
it can be protected: leaving things undone can be avoided by
putting effort into negotiating a more tightly binding contract,
or by selecting trustees more carefully, with weight given on
their earlier performance. No other asset can fully capture
reliability, quality of service or competence: for example, if
large deals with a particular trustee always end in less profit
than was expected, but do not result in losses per se, the
trustee has a spotless reputation money-wise, even if it is not
as attractive a partner as a more reliable enterprise.
The first three assets represent the concrete effects to the
business, which should be an important factor in a trust deci-
sion. The fulfilment asset is a new, more explicit formulation
of the broadly-accepted main aspect of trustworthiness: doing
what was agreed upon. The eBay reputation system [13], as
well as any reputation system based on a simple model of
cooperation or defection, measures only the trustor’s subjective
fulfilment of the deal. The fact that this outcome measure
was the first one to be adopted to reputation systems speaks
for its central nature. The fulfilment asset can help alleviate
the common problem of trustees with the highest reputation
being overwhelmed by requests [14]: once a provider either
turns down proposals or responds to them sluggishly due to
a high load, they will cause worse experiences related to the
fulfilment asset, and a trust decision system can be adjusted
to react to this kind of development quickly.
Outcomes of actions are represented through their effect on
assets. J represents the set of possible outcomes as integers
0..5: 0 for unknown effect, 1 for major negative effect, 2 for
minor negative effect, 3 for no effect, 4 for minor positive
effect, and 5 for major positive effect. |J | = 6. “No effect”
differs from “unknown effect”. For example, not losing or
gaining money would represent a lack of effect, while an
experience with a delayed payment on its way might be
included as an unknown outcome in decision-making. The
trustee defines how a series of events reflects on its assets.
The limits for minor and considerable change are subjective.
For the monetary asset, it is clear that a small company will
focus on smaller amounts of money than a large one, and
therefore the exact numbers to divide all real values to these
five groups will be decided within each organization. This
subjectivity is repeated over the other assets as well, albeit
not quite as pointedly; differences between actors, their values
and expectations complicate the semantics of all experience
sharing, which must be taken into consideration in reputation
systems design and when using information provided by them.
For the control asset, it may be that none of the positive
outcomes are ever used when storing experience, but they are
retained for symmetry.
The limitation to a standard asset set has the benefit of
increased interoperability: experiences based on these assets
can be used across systems with less information lost due
to unmatched or vaguely defined assets. An asset may have a
clear and valuable role in one enterprise, but not be understood
the same way in another.
B. Risk
The risk involved in a positive trust decision depends on
the nature of the action and a prediction of how the trustee is
likely to behave. A risk evaluation is an attempt to partially
predict the costs and benefits resulting from different possible
outcomes and their probabilities. The probabilities are based
on the trustee’s reputation, and are updated as more experience
is gained on the trustee. The possible costs and benefits depend
on the type of action and some of its parameters: for example,
when arranging to buy a book costing ten euros, it is possible
to lose the money if the book is not delivered at all, or
the result is otherwise not considered worth the investment.
However, losing more than the invested ten euros is unlikely.
This means that even though a trustee’s reputation may suggest
they occasionally defect in a way that causes considerable
monetary losses, it would only be possible for them to defect
with a small loss within this particular action.
As risk builds on past information expressed as reputation,
it must also include a measure for the quantity and quality of
the information there exists about it. We measure the amount
of information available, the amount of expressed uncertainty
in it, and the credibility of its sources; these measures are
discussed further in Section III-D.
C. Reputation
As risk estimates aim to define probabilities of different
futures, they must examine the past, represented by reputation,
to learn from it. This requires us to make the assumption
typical for reputation systems: that trustees are sufficiently
consistent in their behaviour for the past to indicate something
about the future.
Reputation represents the current view of a trustor’s trust-
worthiness formed from local experience and shared third-
party experience. The reputation views building on these
two very different sources are stored separately up until the
moment of a trust decision.
Both external and local reputation views follow the same
format. They store the number of experiences in different
outcome types for each asset. A reputation view also stores the
number of cases where no outcome type could be determined
for the asset, which is a measure of the quality of the available
information. To accomodate the credibility analysis of external
information sources, reputation views also store the overall
credibility value for the reputation view, a real number between
0 to 1 used in adjusting the overall uncertainty estimation.
The reputation of a trustee is independent of the action being
considered. Experiences are expressed based on their effects,
not on what kind of action caused them. This allows us to make
decisions based on specific risks, while avoiding the problem
of having information become too sparse. Competence in
performing particular types of actions [15] is also not a part of
our trust model: if an enterprise publishes a service offer that
describes the interface to access its service and then repeatedly
fails to provide it, it has either falsely claimed to be competent,
or has refused to offer it. The end effect to our assets is not
very different either way.
Local reputation consolidates single experiences gathered by
the trustor. These, in turn, are formed by analyzing the output
of the Pilarcos monitors [8]. The monitors are not aware of
the particular assets being protected in the system, but only
detect noteworthy events in the system connected to a business
process; the trust management system needs a policy for
translating the events into outcomes. An example event could
be “product order”, with the price or value of the product as a
parameter. Further parameters would be the trustee’s identifier
and the identifier for the action whose business process the
event connects to.
External reputation is based on information shared by third
parties within a set of reputation networks. The trustor has
representative agents to participate in each network and to
pass information between it and the local reputation system.
The agents report a trustee’s reputation to the network in
the native format of their represented reputation system, and
feed back reputation information from the network into the
local system, which is then transformed to experiences of the
TuBE system format. The information is given a credibility
rating based on a combination of the agent’s view of its
credibility, and the general credibility of the external reputation
system. For example, a long-standing credit rating company
might have a high credibility rating, while an eBay-style
open reputation system would tend to have low credibility,
depicting how vulnerable the system is to reputation attacks.
If an external reputation system has a good representation of
the source’s own uncertainty and supports the evaluation of
different sources’ credibility well, the system’s own credibility
value will be higher.
The views of multiple actors must be combined to produce a
unified reputation view. This can be done by several methods,
such as preferring certain sources over others when they have a
particular part of the information available, or using some kind
of a combination formula such as weighted sums to produce
the result.
Fig. 1. A local reputation view.
While a theoretical model of reputation can accommodate
for infinite amounts of experience information, practical mod-
els must adapt to limited storage space and computational
power: either information must be compressed, or old experi-
ences must be purged after a while. We opt to compress expe-
rience items into outcome counters once it is relatively certain
that there will be no further monitor information to change
the experience; during the uncertain period, experiences can
be kept open to modifications and consolidated on the fly for
trust decisions. Figure 1 depicts a local reputation view.
We trade off timing information for space. The main value
of discounting old information in favour of new [16, pp. 639].
is realized from reacting to changes in behaviour, i.e. by not
allowing a good history to outweigh recent transgressions.
For this goal, we find that time is not the optimal measure
for determining the weight or value of a unit of experience,
but rather whether the experience brings new information;
something we did not already know.
We capture changes in behaviour by dividing reputation
information into epochs, each a new leaf for experience gath-
ering. While the latest turn of behaviour is most interesting, it
is also typical that there is very little experience on it; hence
information from older epochs must also be included. The
weight given to the current epoch determines the speed in
which the system reacts to changes in behaviour. The number
of epochs also measures the consistency of the trustee.
Some central questions related to the implementation of
reputation epochs remain outside the scope of this paper, such
as what constitutes a strong enough change to trigger an epoch
change, and how credible the information related to the change
needs to be. These are issues of calibration, and must be
explored further by simulating different models for reaction
sensitivity.
D. Building a risk estimate from experience
The risk R of an action contains |A| vectors ra, one for
each asset. We omit the context adjustments here in favour of
a clearer description of the central processes.
R = (r0, r1, ..., r|A|−1), where ra = (pa, |E|, c, qa)
The vectors store the probabilities of different known out-
comes for each asset, and three different measures of the
amount and quality of the information used to produce the
evaluation. The risk evaluation is specific to a given trustor,
trustee and action; we omit references to these three parame-
ters in the formalism for readability.
The first term pa is a vector that represents the probabilities
of different outcomes: pa = (pa,1, ..., pa,|J]−1), where each
pa,j is the calculated probability of outcome j happening for
asset a; J is the set of outcome categories {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
presented in Section III-A. The latter indexes begin from 1; the
probability of an unknown outcome is not considered, but in-
formation about unknown outcomes in the past is represented
through another term, qa. We require that the probabilities add
up to 1 for all assets, i.e. for all a ∈ A, ∑|J|−1j=1 pa,j = 1.
E represents the group of all experiences the trustor has
on the trustee in its reputation view, and the number of
experiences, |E|, measures the amount of reputation infor-
mation behind the risk estimation. The third term, c, is the
combined credibility of local reputation and external, third-
party reputation information at the time of evaluation. The
last measure, qa, is the number of experiences in E where the
outcome was unknown for asset a: the higher this value is in
relation to |E|, the lower the certainty of the risk analysis. We
return to these quantity and quality measures in transforming
reputation information into a risk analysis.
The reputation U of a trustee as viewed by a given trustor
consists of two halves: a local reputation Ulocal, and a subjec-
tive evaluation of third-party reputation information Uext.
The structure of both halves is the same: each contains |A|
vectors and a credibility score clocal or cext in the range [0..1].
The credibility value clocal of local reputation is 1, while the
third-party reputation credibility value cext is set based on the
trustor’s analysis of the combined credibility of the reputation
system the information comes from, and the credibility of
the sources providing reputation information in that network.
To avoid repetition, we present the two symmetric reputation
structures as generic variables that are equal for both halves,
denoting this with an asterisk (∗). For example, U∗ represents
both Ulocal and Uext; the formulae are the same for both
halves, while the values are different.
Both types of reputation consist of |A| vectors u∗a, one for
each asset:
U∗ = (u∗0,u
∗
1, ...,u
∗
|A|−1), where u
∗
a = (u
∗
a,0, u
∗
a,1, ..., u
∗
a,|J|−1)
The counters u∗a,j express the number of experiences of
outcome j ∈ J for asset a, with j = 0 representing an
unknown effect.
The set of experiences, E∗, is an abstract group
E∗ = {e∗k : e∗k,a = outcome value j ∈ J,∀a ∈ A}.
That is, an experience consists of the effects of one action
expressed for each asset. Each experience e∗k also belongs to
one epoch. The index k ranges from 0 to |E∗| − 1.
Given the set of experiences, the reputation counters u∗a,j
can be expressed as the size of the subgroup of E where the
experiences had outcome j for asset a, that is: u∗a,j = |E∗a,j |,
where E∗a,j = {e∗k ∈ E∗ : e∗k,a = j}. The value u∗a,0 is
particularly interesting, as it expresses the number of experi-
ences with unknown values for the asset: we name it q∗a. When
compared to the total number of experiences, |E∗|, it provides
us a measure on the quality of the information.
Reputation is transformed into risk by 1) merging the local
and external reputation views together with a weighted sum,
2) scaling the experience counters representing known effects
to proportions in the range [0..1] and 3) recalculating a joint
credibility and information content score for the result, that is,
the variables c, |E| and qa that appear in the risk vectors.
The local and external reputation views are merged based
on the amount of information available in either, and the
credibility attached to the views. Local reputation is more
credible than external, but there is usually less local infor-
mation available, and both should be reflected on the weight
given to local reputation. We define two functions, µlocal and
µext, to determine the weights for both local and external
reputation values. They use the corresponding credibility value
c∗, amount of experience |E∗| and a vector q∗ of the number
of experiences where the effects are unknown for different
assets: q∗ = (q∗0 , q∗1 , ..., q∗|A|−1) = (u
∗
0,0, u
∗
1,0, ..., u
∗
(|A|−1),0).
The multipliers produced by the µ∗ functions add up to 1;
the specific declaration of the µ∗ functions depends on local
calibration.
µlocal(clocal, |Elocal|,qlocal) + µext(cext, |Eext|,qext) = 1.
To support more than one epoch, the µ∗ values can be divided
beyond the two groups. Merging follows the same pattern, with
each ∗-marked variable appearing separately for each epoch.
Using the µ∗ functions, we merge the experiences into a
temporary Umerged = (umerged0 ,u
merged
1 , ...,u
merged
|A|−1 ), where
each vector umergeda contains six combined counters u
merged
a,j :
the weighed sum of the local and external respective counters.
Note that unlike the values in ulocala and uexta , these merged
values are no longer integers, but real numbers. For all a ∈
A, j ∈ J , we have:
umergeda,j =
∑
∗∈{local,ext}
µ∗(c∗, |E∗|,q∗) ∗ u∗a, j
In the second phase, we scale the experience counters except
the unknowns to the range [0..1] to represent probability. To
achieve this, we sum the values of known effects (j 6= 0) and
divide each value by the sum. As a result, we get the pa,j
values mentioned earlier in the risk representation.
∀j ∈ J\{0} pa,j =
umergeda,j∑|J|
j=1 u
merged
a,j
In the third phase, we calculate combined measures of the
quality of information: c, |E|, and the vector of |A| different
qa values. The combined credibility c is determined by a µ-
weighted average of the local and external credibilities. It
depicts the weight given to each half in the probabilities as
well.
c =
∑
∗∈{local,ext}
µ∗(c∗, |E∗|,q∗) ∗ c∗
To calculate the total number of experiences, |E|, we sum
the number of local and external experiences: |E| = |Elocal|+
|Eext|. Although it is clear that not all experiences have been
given equal weight in the evaluation, this measure gives an
indication of how much information there is available on the
actor overall. The combined number of experiences for each
asset where the effect was unknown, qa, is gotten by adding the
values of the previously calculated q∗ vectors, for all a ∈ A:
qa = qlocala + q
ext
a = u
local
a,0 + u
ext
a,0
Again, not all unknowns weigh equally in the probability
calculations, so we could consider a µ-weighted average here
similarly to the calculation of the credibility value c. On the
other hand, the true total number of unknowns is a more useful
value to use together with the amount of total experience, |E|,
as qa/|E| gives the proportion of uncertain values.
E. Risk tolerance and importance
A trustor’s risk tolerance is determined by the situation call-
ing for a trust decision, independent of the trustees’ behaviour.
It depends on the business importance of the action, and local
policy expressing the trustor’s general risk attitude, encom-
passing the tolerance of both certain probabilities of various
outcomes, and the uncertainty in the information. Tolerance is
expressed as a set of constraints for the risk evaluation; if the
constraints are met, a trust decision is positive. The constraints
are asset-specific, and can give upper or lower bounds either to
probabilities of particular outcomes, the sum of probabilities of
a set of outcomes, or the measures of uncertainty. The bounds
can be absolute or relative, containing comparisons between
probabilities: for example the probability of monetary gain can
be required to be larger than the probability of loss.
A trustor’s risk attitude determines how risk-averse or risk-
seeking the trustor is. A risk-averse trustor will require that an
action have high importance to balance for the risk a positive
decision would cause, while a risk-seeking trustor can accept
a higher risk in relation to the baseline set by the action’s
importance.
Building a configuration system to help a trustor express
their risk attitude through these formulae is an important item
of future work. The aim is to bring the level of expression
for configurations as close to the business processes and the
language of the decision-makers as possible, and minimizing
configuration work that requires expensive consultation.
The importance factor expresses the business value of the
action, and the cost of a negative trust decision. The costs
and benefits do not depend on the expected behaviour of
the trustee. For example, a negative trust decision blocking
an action may result in compensation clauses being activated
in the contract between the trustor and trustee. The required
compensation may still be small enough that blocking the
action is preferrable to risking that the trustee causes greater
losses by defection.
Importance information covers the investment required by
the action and the guaranteed return of investment, when for
example a certain group of actions are considered to be so
valuable that requests for them get a high priority. To a bank,
for example, a cheap loan may be a strategic way to attract
customers to move all their banking services to it. Importance
should also capture a lack of real choice, should it occur, and
more generally the perceived cost of denying service to the
trustee. The valuations considered may include the interests
of the surrounding business network, adjusted based on how
much weight the trustor decides to place on them.
Importance is expressed in the form of assets, and gains
or losses to each asset caused by approving the action. For a
particular action and its parameters, its importance is defined
as the effect it has for each asset.
The risk evaluation must be compared to the risk tolerance
to produce a trust decision. The risk tolerance T of an action,
given a particular trustor and trustee, is a vector of |A|
functions fa, one for each asset.
T = (f0, f1, ..., f|A|−1)
The functions represent the acceptable limits for the risk values
in the risk vectors ra: they evaluate whether the values are
within bounds or not.
∀a ∈ A, fa(ra) =
{
1 if the values of ra are within bounds
0 otherwise
Risk tolerance depends on the importance of an action. The
importance factor I contains |A| values va, one for each asset.
I = (v0, v1, ..., v|A|−1)
The values express the known effects a positive trust decision
has on different assets: for all a ∈ A, va = an effect value j ∈
J\{0}. There are no unknown effects (j = 0) for importance:
it depicts only those assumed effects and valuations in the
enterprise that affect decision-making.
Both importance and risk tolerance depend on the trustor,
trustee and action. Risk tolerance is evaluated based on the
importance value; each trustor determines the exact evaluation
function ΦT(I) that produces the risk tolerance T.
Once the reputation values have been transformed into a
risk evaluation, and the risk tolerance functions generated from
the importance values, the actual evaluation is straightforward:
the evaluation result is positive (1) if all the risk tolerance
functions evaluate to 1 with the risk vectors, i.e. fa(ra) = 1
for all assets a ∈ A, and negative (0) otherwise.
F. Trust decisions in the middleware
The trust management system acts as a guard between a
service application and the outside world. Service requests and
responses from the service are routed through the guard, which
triggers trust decisions whenever risk-relevant commitments
are being made, and blocks the messages when needed.
When a decision must be made, the guard calls the trust
management system to evaluate the risk and risk toler-
ance [10]. The information the decision is based on is pre-
processed and quick to access; reputation information is con-
stantly gathered through Pilarcos monitors [8] and processed in
the background, and importance information is readily defined.
IV. RELATED WORK
The TuBE system manages trust for enterprise collabora-
tion in the open service market. Routine trust decisions are
automated, evaluating the four factors of risk, reputation, risk
tolerance and importance.
The TrustCoM project is developing a framework for trust,
security and contract management for dynamic inter-enterprise
collaborations. The framework includes a virtual breeding
environment, a yellow pages service for finding partners, a
reputation management service and a risk analysis tool to
guide contract forming [17]. TrustCoM limits the group of
potential partners beforehand by a pre-contract, and its contract
negotiations are human-driven. TuBE operates in an open ser-
vice market unbound by pre-contracts; the openness sets more
strict requirements for trust management. The ECOLEAD
project [18] aims to build infrastructure services such as
billing, tools for human collaboration and federated executing
of joint workflow descriptions.
The SECURE project has produced a trust management sys-
tem directed towards private people [19]. It includes a model of
trust which is updated through observations, and a single-asset
risk evaluation based on cost-benefit probability distribution
functions. The SECURE system learns from experience and
models the situation the trust decision is made in, such as
risks involved. The trust model is aware of the amount of
information available, which is a necessary feature for inter-
organizational trust management as well. It has no concept of
business value, but defines fixed decision policies.
Risk tolerance is typically only expressed indirectly, with,
for example, a fixed threshold set for minimum reputation [14],
or policies which require the trustee to prove their trustwor-
thiness by presenting a given set of certificates [20]. In the
latter case, the required certification can vary based on what
kind of access the trustee requires; there is a clear indication
for a need for action-aware risk tolerance.
Reputation systems are prevalent in electronic commerce,
and have been identified as a central means to support a
healthy electronic marketplace [21]. Typically, decisions and
processing the credibility and relevance of the provided rep-
utation information is left to the human user, which allows
systems such as eBay [13] to operate without a formal model
of risk analysis and tolerance.
Importance and business value are relatively rarely seen to
factor into automated trust decisions [15]; Poblano uses im-
portance as a factor to extend evaluations based on reputation
with the trustor’s local valuations [22]. Importance is bound
to the objectives of the trustor, and in simple systems where
all trustors are assumed to share a single objective, modelling
importance is not a central issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model for automating routine trust
decisions in an inter-enterprise collaboration context. The
model identifies and addresses the business-level goal of
guarding identified assets through trust decisions. It supports
evaluating risks to assets based on knowledge of the trustee’s
past behaviour, which is encoded in reputation. The trustor’s
risk tolerance is determined through evaluating the known
costs and benefits of a positive decision, such as building a
partnership or avoiding the activation of a compensation clause
in an existing contract.
The TuBE trust management system acts as a guard between
enterprises that wish to collaborate to realize a business
opportunity, but cannot fully trust each other. In an open,
market-driven environment, the autonomy of potential partners
will always cause uncertainty which must be either accepted
or avoided at the cost of missing a potential opportunity. A
decision on commitment must consider the incentives and risks
involved; measuring or simulating the actual emotional state of
any human decision makers is not a primary goal. Trust covers
the gap between risks and measures in place to reduce them,
but risk tolerance policies determine exactly how trusting the
enterprise is willing to be.
Future work involves refining the mechanisms involving
reputation epochs further, and evaluating the model through
its responses to threat scenarios. The communication between
the TuBE reputation system and external reputation networks
will also be further refined. Standards and a basic ontology
are required to ensure that reputation and trust information
for inter-enterprise collaboration are well-defined.
We find that trust management between partners must be
supported by a system for automating routine trust decisions.
No collaboration is feasible without mutual trust between
partners.
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